March 26, 2003
www.iraqwar.ru
The IRAQWAR.RU analytical
center was created recently by a group of journalists
and military experts from Russia to provide accurate
and up-to-date news and analysis of the war against
Iraq. The following is the English translation of the
IRAQWAR.RU report based on the Russian military intelligence
reports.
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March
26, 2003, 1230hrs MSK (GMT +3), Moscow - As of the morning
March 26 fierce battles have resumed in Iraq along the
entire front. As was previously expected the sand storm
has halted the advance of the coalition forces. Additionally,
the coalition troops were in serious need of rest, resupply
and reinforcement.
For
much of the day unfavorable weather paralyzed combat
activities of one of the main attack groups of the coalition
- the 101st Airborne Division, which was forced to completely
curtail all of its combat operations. Combat readiness
of this division is of strategic importance to the entire
coalition force primarily due to the fact that the division
operates 290 helicopters of various types, including
the 72 Apache
attack helicopters. The 101st Airborne Division along with
the 82nd Airborne Division and the 3rd Infantry
Division (Mechanized) forms the backbone of the XVIII Airborne
Corps - the main strike force of the coalition.
In
essence, the 101st Airborne Division provides suppression
of the enemy while simultaneously conducting aerial reconnaissance
and suppression of any newly-discovered enemy forces.
It
maintain constant
contact with the enemy and contains the enemy until the
main forces arrive.
Currently
the coalition's main forces are conducting combat operations
along the approaches to the towns of Karabela and An-Najaf.
During
the past 24 hours the coalition units in these areas
sustained 4 killed and up to 10 wounded. All indications
are that one coalition special operations helicopter
was lost and no communication with the helicopter could
be
established.
The faith of
its crew and the troops it carried is still being investigated.
Another two coalition helicopters made emergency landings
in areas controlled by friendly forces. Aircraft engines
were found to be extremely susceptible to the effects
of sand.
As
was determined by our [GRU] intelligence even before
the start of combat operations, the primary goal of the
coalition command was an energetic advance across the
desert along the right bank of the Euphrates river, reaching
the central Iraq with a further thrust toward Baghdad
through Karabela. Another strategic attack was to go
around Basra through An-Nasiriya toward Al-Ammara followed
by a full isolation of the southern [Iraqi] forces, effectively
splitting Iraq in half.
The
first part of the plan - a march across the desert toward
Karabela - was achieved, albeit with serious delays.
The second part of the plan in essence has failed. Up
to
this moment the coalition troops were unable to punch
through the Iraqi defenses near An-Nasiriya and to force
the Iraqis toward Al-Ammara, which would have allowed
the coalition to clear the way to Baghdad along the
strategically important Mesopotamian
river valley with Tigris and Euphrates covering the flanks
of the advancing forces. So far only a few coalition
units were able to get to the left bank of the Euphrates,
where they are trying to widen their staging areas.
Additionally,
the prolonged fighting near An-Nasiriya allowed the Iraqis
to withdraw most of their forces from Basra region and
to avoid being surrounded.
Currently
the coalition forces are trying to get across the river
near An-Najaf and Karabela, where, all indications are,
heavy combat will continue during the next two days.
Harsh
criticism from the top US military leadership and pressure
from Washington forced the coalition command to resort
to more energetic actions. In addition to that the shock
of the first days of war among the coalition troops,
when they expected an easy trek across Iraq but encountered
stiff resistance, is now wearing off. They are now being "absorbed" into
the war. Now the coalition actions are becoming more
coherent and adequate. The coalition command
is gradually taking the initiative away from the Iraqis,
which is in part due to the reliance of the
Iraqi command on inflexible defensive tactics.
Now
the main tactical move of the US troops is to use their
aerial and ground reconnaissance forces to test the Iraqi
defenses, to open them up and, without entering direct
close combat, to deliver maximum damage using artillery
and ground attack aircraft. The coalition has finally
stopped pointlessly moving around in convoys, as was
characteristic of the first three days of the ground
war.
The
tactics allowed for increased combat effectiveness and
considerably increased losses of the
Iraqi side. Due to such attacks by the coalition during
the previous night and today's early morning the Iraqis
have
lost
250 troops
killed
and
up to
500 wounded. Up to 10 Iraqi tanks were destroyed and up
to three Iraqi artillery batteries were suppressed.
However,
despite of the increased combat effectiveness, the coalition
forces have so far failed
to capture a single sizable town in Iraq. Only by the end
of the sixth day the British marine infantry was able to
establish tentative control over the tiny town of Umm
Qasr. During
the hours of darkness all movement around the town is stopped
and the occupying troops withdraw to defensive positions.
Constant exchanges of fire take place throughout the town.
Out of more than 1,500-strong local garrison the British
managed to capture only 150 Iraqis. The rest has either
withdrew toward Basra or changed into civilian clothes
and resorted to partisan actions.
Near
Basra the British forces in essence are laying a Middle
Ages-style siege of a city with
the population of two million. Artillery fire has destroyed
most of the city's life-supporting infrastructure and artillery
is used continuously against the positions of the defending
units. The main goal of the British is two maintain a strict
blockade of Basra. Their command is confident that the
situation in the city can be destabilized and lack of
food, electricity
and water will prompt the local population to cause the
surrender of the defending forces. Analysts point out that
capture of Basra is viewed by the coalition command as
being exceptionally important and as a model for the future "bloodless" takeover
of Baghdad.
So far, however, this approach does not
work and the city's garrison is actively defending its
territory. Just during the past night at least three British
soldiers were killed and eight more were wounded in the
exchange of fire [near Basra].
It
is difficult not to not to notice the extremely overstretched
frontline of the coalition. This
frontline is stretching toward Baghdad through An-Najaf
and Karabela and its right flank goes all the way along
the Euphrates and is completely exposed. All main supply
and communication lines of the coalition are going through
unprotected desert. Already the supply routes are stretching
for more than 350 kilometers and are used to deliver 800
tonnes of fuel and up to 1,000 tonnes of ammunition, food
and other supplies daily to the advancing forces.
If
the Iraqis deliver a decisive strike at the base of this
front, the coalition will find itself
in a very difficult situation, with its main forces, cutoff
from the resupply units, losing their combat readiness
and mobility and falling an easy pray to the Iraqis.
It
is possible that the Americans are relying on the power
of their aviation that should prevent
any such developments. It is also possible that this kind
of self confidence may be very dangerous.
Massive
numbers of disabled combat vehicles and other equipment
becomes a strategic problem for the
coalition. Already, radio intercepts indicate, all available
repair units have been deployed to the front. Over 60%
of all available spare parts have been already used and
emergency additional supplies are being requested.
The
sand is literally "eating up" the
equipment. Sand has a particularly serious effect on electronics
and transmissions of combat vehicles. Already more than
40 tanks and up to 69 armored personnel carriers have been
disabled due to damaged engines; more than 150 armored
vehicles have lost the use of their heat-seeking targeting
sights and night vision equipment. Fine dust gets into
all openings and clogs up all moving parts.
The coalition command has effectively
acknowledged its defeat in the information war with the
strikes against the television center in Baghdad and now
further strikes should be expected against television and
ground satellite transmitters. The coalition is attempting
to leave the Iraqis without information in order to demoralize
them.
The
extreme length of the resupply routes and the actions
of the Iraqi reconnaissance units have
created a new problem: the coalition command is forced
to admit that it has no information about the conditions
on the roads. Currently, as intercepted radio communications
show, the coalition command is trying to establish the
whereabouts of more than 500 of its troops that fell behind
their units, departed with resupply convoys or were carrying
out individual assignments. So far it was not possible
to establish how many of these troops are dead, captured
or have successfully reached other units.
(source: iraqwar.ru,
03-26-03, translated by Venik)
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